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Abstract
Normative decision theory proves inadequate for modeling human responses to the social-
engineering campaigns of Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attacks. Behavioral decision theory
fares better, but still falls short of capturing social-engineering attack vectors, which operate
through emotions and peripheral-route persuasion. We introduce a generalized decision theory,
under which any decision will be made according to one of multiple coexisting choice criteria.
We denote the set of possible choice criteria by C. Thus the proposed model reduces to conven-
tional Expected Utility theory when | CEU| = 1, whilst Dual-Process (thinking fast vs. thinking
slow) decision making corresponds to a model with | CDP| = 2. We consider a more general
case with | C| ≥ 2, which necessitates careful consideration of how, for a particular choice-task
instance, one criterion comes to prevail over others. We operationalize this with a probability
distribution that is conditional upon traits of the decision maker as well as upon the context
and the framing of choice options. Whereas existing Signal Detection Theory (SDT) models of
phishing detection commingle the different peripheral-route persuasion pathways, in the present
descriptive generalization the different pathways are explicitly identified and represented. A
number of implications follow immediately from this formulation, ranging from the conditional
nature of security-breach risk to delineation of the prerequisites for valid tests of security train-
ing. Moreover, the model explains the ‘stepping-stone’ penetration pattern of APT attacks,
which has confounded modeling approaches based on normative rationality.
Keywords: phishing, social engineering, peripheral-route persuasion, advanced persistent threat,
choice criteria, dual-process theory, latent class model
JEL classification: D81, D91
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1 INTRODUCTION
The human element in decision making is not only deliberative, but also emotional, intuitive,
and fallible. Social-engineering campaigns target and exploit these non-deliberative features of
human decision making.(1–7) A major lacuna for security-behavior modeling is that standard
decision theory fails to capture the peripheral-route persuasion pathways that are exploited in
social-engineering campaigns.
In contrast, Signal Detection Theory (SDT) has been successfully adapted to model human
responses to phishing attacks.1 The flexibility of SDT is instrumental in this context. This flex-
ibility has been exploited to study the distinct consequences for security-breach risk estimates
of premising the model solely upon normative decision theory, solely upon behavioral decision
theory, or upon the combination of behavioral decision theory and susceptibility to peripheral-
route persuasion.(8) Unsurprisingly, the latter combination proves most useful and informative.
Nevertheless, two limitations may be observed in the existing SDT-based approach: (i) decision
makers are assumed to be permanently characterized by one fixed decision-making model, and
(ii) the effects of different peripheral-route persuasion pathways feed into, and become commin-
gled in, a single value of the discriminability parameter.2 Descriptive validity favors relaxation
of the former, while interpretability of modeling favors relaxation of the latter.
We introduce a generalization of decision theory that fulfills these desiderata.3 The general-
ization comprises two principal components.
First, a non-degenerate set C of ‘ways of deciding’ – here called ‘choice criteria’ – which in
the phishing context includes not only Expected Utility (EU) to capture rational deliberative
decision making, but also Prospect Theory (PT) which captures behavioral decision-making,(11)
a ‘routinely click-straight-through’ element that captures unmotivated and unthinking routinized
actions (automaticity),(12) and an ‘impulsively click-through’ element that captures emotionally
motivated impulsive actions.(1–7) This approach therefore generalizes not only EU and PT, but
also Dual-Process (DP) theories.4
1In a phishing attack, a network user receives an email containing either an attachment or a website link,
which if opened, prompts the user to enter personal information (e.g. passwords) or infects the user’s computer
with malware that records such information surreptitiously. For SDT-based models of phishing vulnerability, see
Kaivanto,(8) and Canfield and Fischhoff.(9)
2The standardized distance between the means of the sampling distributions, respectfully under the null and
alternative hypotheses.
3The theory we present here is a specialization of Iain Embrey’s ‘States of Mind and States of Nature’
formulation.(10)
4CHere ⊃ CDP ⊃ CEU, CPT.
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It also formalizes the notion – to which the paper’s title alludes – that there are several
distinct types or classes of phishing ploy, and that individuals’ susceptibility differs across qual-
itatively distinct social-engineering attack vectors. It is important to distinguish between these
distinct phishing attack vectors – both to understand individuals’ behavioral responses to them,
and to understand organizations’ total security-breach risk exposure. A phishing ploy that plays
upon the prospect of a time-delimited opportunity for wealth is constructed very differently –
and is processed very differently by its recipient(s) – than a phishing ploy that plays upon
employees’ standard routines of unquestioningly responding to bosses’ and colleagues’ emails,
opening any appended email attachments, and clicking on enclosed links. An organization’s
email security training may effectively address the former, but in many organizations the latter
remains a worrying vulnerability.
The second component of the generalization is a conditional probability distribution over
the different choice criteria, i.e. over the elements of the set C. As each new choice task is
confronted, a draw from this distribution determines which choice criterion becomes operative,
and so we will refer to it as the State-of-Mind (SoM) distribution for an individual i at time
t. We allow an individual’s SoM distribution to be conditional upon: their psychological traits
and decision-experiences, the situational context of the decision, and the framing of the choice
options. This approach is similar to that of two existing addiction models(13,14) although we
extend those models by allowing the framing of the choice options to be strategically determined
by an adversarial agent (the attacker), and by allowing both the prior-experiences and situational
context of a decision to be strategically influenced by an allied agent (the Information Security
Officer).
A key advantage of the present formulation is the top-level differentiation of the decision
maker’s susceptibility to different kinds of phishing ploys. This formulation yields a number of
immediate implications. First, the overall security-breach risk due to phishing can not be con-
ceived in unconditional terms. Since an individual’s susceptibility to phishing depends on the
type of phishing ploy, the phishing-ploy-type exposure distribution takes on importance, as does
the intensity of this exposure (i.e. the total number of phishing emails traversing the spam filter)
and the quality of phishing-ploy execution. Second, a single test-phishing email is insufficient for
evaluating the effectiveness of email security training. Email security training does not necessar-
ily generalize across different choice criteria. Hence, a single test-phishing email may determine
3
the robustness of security practice towards one particular phishing ploy, but it is orthogonal to
potential vulnerabilities within the remaining choice criteria. Third, not only is the organiza-
tion’s security-breach risk conditional, but the attacker gets to choose the phishing-ploy-type
exposure distribution, as well as the intensity of this exposure. The attacker has first-mover
advantage. Moreover, the attacker always has the option to develop new phishing-ploy types
that are not addressed by the organization’s existing working practices and training materials.
Fourth, given working practices in most organizations and given the dimensions over which the
attacker can tailor a phishing campaign, it is clear that the attacker can attain a very high total
probability of successfully breaching the target organization’s cybersecurity. In part, this is due
to the fact that typical working practices in non-high-security organizations5 do not involve
special treatment of embedded links or attached files.6 It is also due to the disjunctive accu-
mulation (addition, rather than multiplication) of successful-security-breach probabilities over
spam-filter-traversing phishing emails. But it is also due to the scope for using rich contextual
information to tailor a campaign into a spear-phishing attack – i.e. to specifically target the
‘routinely click-straight-through’ choice criterion characterized by automaticity.
Furthermore, our model supports an explanation for the ‘stepping-stone penetration pattern’
that is common in APT attacks. Whereas models of security behavior premised upon normative
rationality have not been successful in explaining the stepping-stone pattern, we show that in
light of a coexisting-choice-criteria model of security behavior, the stepping-stone penetration
pattern may be recovered as a constrained-optimal attack vector.
The sequel is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the phishing literature, show-
ing that phishing attacks employ social-engineering techniques that circumvent deliberatively
rational decision processes. Section 3 reviews the empirical literature in which multiple ‘ways
of deciding’ have been documented empirically, establishing a rigorous empirically grounded
basis for the coexisting-choice-criteria model. Section 4 introduces the coexisting-choice-criteria
model, and illustrates some of its properties, including its ability to support an explanation of
the stepping-stone penetration pattern (Section 4.3). Section 5 concludes.
5e.g. commercial, administrative, professional-service, and higher-education organizations
6For instance the production of research articles involves multiple exchanges of emails among coauthors them-
selves, between the coauthors and the journal’s editorial team, and then between the coauthors and the publisher’s
production team. These emails contain file attachments, and sometimes URLs as well. In these exchanges, there
is no security procedure in place to authenticate emails, their attachments, or embedded URLs.
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2 PHISHING TARGETS THE HUMAN ELEMENT
The capacity for rational deliberation is a feature of human beings, albeit not the overriding
trait it was thought to be when Carl Linnaeus coined the binary nomenclature, Homo sapiens.7
Both large-scale and narrowly targeted social engineering are predicated upon the intuitive,
emotional, and fallible nature of human behavior, and it is now recognized that psychology is
an essential component – alongside engineering and economics – for understanding information
security.(15)
More than half of all US government network security-incident reports concern phishing
attacks, and the number of phishing emails being sent to users of federal networks is growing
rapidly.(16,17) The FBI and the DHS recently issued an amber alert warning of APT activity tar-
geting energy – especially, nuclear power8 – and other sectors.(19) In this broad APT campaign,
spear phishing was the preferred initial-breach technique. The corporate sector is targeted more
widely, commonly using phishing to create an entry point, for the purposes of extortion, illegally
acquiring customer-information (and credentials) databases, as well as for acquiring commer-
cially sensitive information. The incidence of corporate cyber espionage is not systematically
disclosed, but many of the high-profile examples of corporate hacking that have come into the
public domain were staged via phishing.(20)
Online scams such as phishing and spear phishing employ techniques of persuasion that have
collectively been labeled ‘social engineering’.(2,6) These techniques eschew direct, rational argu-
mentation in favor of ‘peripheral’ routes to persuasion. The most prominent of these peripheral
pathways to persuasion are, in no particular order: (i) authority, (ii) scarcity, (iii) similarity and
identification, (iv) reciprocation, (v) consistency following commitment, and (vi) social proof.(1–7)
Scams9 typically augment peripheral-route persuasion by setting up a scenario that creates psy-
chological pressure by triggering visceral emotions that override rational deliberation.(3,21,22)
Visceral emotions – such as greed, envy, pity, lust, fear and anxiety – generate psychological
discomfort as long as the underlying need remains unfulfilled, and psychological pleasure or even
euphoria when that need is fulfilled. The manipulative scenario is deliberately structured so that
the scammer’s proposition offers the double prospect of relief from the visceral discomfort as
7Sapience denotes wisdom and the capacity for sound judgment, particularly in complex or difficult circum-
stances.
8For instance, the non-operational computer systems of Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation in Kansas
were penetrated.(18)
9as well as ‘hard-sell’ and ‘high-pressure’ marketing more generally,
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well as visceral satisfaction upon fulfilling the underlying need.
An ideally scripted scam scenario contrives a compelling, credible need for immediate action.
If a scam-scenario script falls short of this ideal, it will almost invariably emphasize the urgency
with which action must be taken.(3,21,22) In itself, this introduces visceral anxiety where none
existed before, and simultaneously, precludes the availability of time for cooling off and for
rational deliberation. Visceral emotions have both a direct hedonic impact as well as an impact
via altering the relative desirability of different cues and attributes. Crucially, visceral emotions
also affect how decision makers process information, narrowing and restricting attention to the
focal hedonic cue and its availability (or absence) in the present.(21,22) Since visceral emotions –
and their concomitant effects on attention and relative desirability of different cues/attributes
– are short lived, scam scripts contrive reasons for immediate action.10
At sufficiently high levels of intensity, visceral emotions can override rational deliberation
entirely.(21) Mass phishing scams often aim to exploit human emotions in this fashion. Spear
phishing attacks, on the other hand, typically aim to exploit the intuitive and fallible nature
of human decision making without necessarily stoking emotion. This approach targets the
routinization and automaticity(12) upon which successful management of a high-volume inbox
rests. For most civilian organizations outside the security community, employees trust emails
– and any embedded URLs and file attachments – sent by bosses and immediate colleagues,
and frequently also those sent by more distant contacts. Failure to do so would bring most
organizations to a halt. Spear phishing thus exploits this routine and unquestioning trust that
is automatically extended to bosses, colleagues, and contacts – and unintendedly, to plausible
facsimiles thereof.
More surprising is the fact that spear phishing emails endowed with rich contextual informa-
tion have been deployed successfully on both sides of the civilian/non-civilian and security/non-
security divides. A partial list of successfully breached governmental, defense, corporate, and
scientific organizations includes the White House, the Australian Government, the Reserve Bank
of Australia, the Canadian Government, the Epsilon mailing list service, Gmail, Lockheed Mar-
tin, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, RSA SecureID, Coka Cola Co., Chesapeake Energy, and
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation.(16–18,20,24) When implemented well with appropriate
contextual information, a spear-phishing email simply does not attract critical evaluation, and
10A former swindler relates the principle: “It is imperative that you work as quickly as possible. Never give a
hot mooch time to cool off. You want to close him while he is still slobbering with greed.”(23)
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its contents are acted upon in a routine and automatic fashion.
3 COEXISTING CHOICE CRITERIA: EMPIRICAL PROVENANCE
Decision theorists are gradually coming to terms with the implications of dual-process theory,
which has been developed by psychologists and recently popularized by Daniel Kahneman in
Thinking, Fast and Slow.(25)
Meanwhile, a well-established stream of empirical-decision-theory literature offers legitima-
tion for the notion that there may be more than one way of reaching a decision. That literature
captures heterogeneity in choice criteria with Finite Mixture (FM) models. Standard estima-
tion procedures for such models allow the data to determine how many different choice criteria
are present, and then to provide, for each individual, the respective criterion-type member-
ship probabilities. In Glenn Harrison and Elisabet Rutstro¨m’s FM models,11 the traditional
single-criterion specification is statistically rejected, in their words providing “a decent funeral
for the representative agent model that assumes only one type of decision process.”(26) In turn,
Coller et al.’s FM models show that “observed choices in discounting experiments are consistent
with roughly one-half of the subjects using exponential discounting and one-half using quasi-
hyperbolic discounting.”(27) And using a Bayesian approach, Houser et al. show that different
people use different decision rules – specifically, one of three different criteria – when solving
dynamic decision problems.(28)
Multiple choice criteria are also well established in the empirical-game-theory literature.
Stahl and Wilson fit an FM model to data on play in several classes of of 3×3 normal-form games,
and find that players fall into five different boundedly rational choice-criteria classes.(29) Guessing
games – a.k.a. Beauty-Contest games – have been pivotal in showing not only that backward
induction and dominance-solvability break down, but also that game play can be characterized by
membership in a boundedly rational, discrete (level-k) depth-of-reasoning class.(30) FM models
are the technique of choice for analyzing Beauty-Contest data, revealing that virtually all ‘non-
theorist’ subjects12 (94%) fall into one of three boundedly rational depth-of-reasoning classes
(levels 0, 1 or 2).(31,32) FM models are being applied increasingly in empirical game theory –
including to the analysis of e.g. trust-game data, social-preferences data, and common-pool-
11of decision making under risk
12those who are not professional game theorists
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resource data – demonstrating the broad applicability of a multiple-criteria approach. The
theoretical relevance of level-k reasoning to adversarial interactions such as phishing has been
further demonstrated by Rothschild et al.,(33) however we know of no existing paper in this field
that allows alternative choice criteria to coexist.
Outside decision theory and empirical game theory, the necessity of allowing for multiple
choice criteria has also been recognized in the fields of transportation research and consumer
research. Within a Latent Class (LC) model framework,13 Hess et al. study the question
of whether “actual behavioral processes used in making a choice may in fact vary across re-
spondents within a single dataset.”(34) Preference heterogeneity documented in conventional
single-choice-criterion models14 may be a logical consequence of the single-choice-criterion re-
striction (i.e. misspecification). Hess et al. account for choice-criterion heterogeneity in four
different transport-mode-choice datasets by fitting LC models. These LC models distinguish
between conventional random utility and the lexicographic choice criterion (dataset 1), among
choice criteria with different reference points (dataset 2),15 between standard random utility
and the elimination-by-aspects choice criterion (dataset 3), and between standard random util-
ity and the random-regret choice criterion (dataset 4).(34) Finally, Swait and Adamowicz show
that consumers also fall into different ‘decision strategy’ LCs, and that increasing either the
complexity of the choice task or the cumulative task burden induces switching toward simpler
decision strategies.(35) These results underscore an interpretation of the choice-criterion prob-
abilities that is only implicit in the above-mentioned studies: that (a) decision makers should
not be characterized solely in terms of their modal choice criterion, but in terms of their choice-
criterion mixtures, and that (b) the criterion that is operative for a particular choice task is
obtained as a draw from the probability distribution over choice criteria, which in turn is condi-
tional upon features of the context, the framing and presentation of the choice options,and the
current psychological characteristics of the decision maker.
In light of these FM- and LC-model findings, accommodation of multiple choice criteria
emerges as a natural step toward improving the descriptive validity of theoretical models.
13Latent Class (LC) models are specializations of FM models.
14e.g. heterogeneity in risk aversion in EU models, and heterogeneity in probability weighting in PT models
15note that standard random utility has no reference point
8
4 INCORPORATING Homo intuivus, emotus et fallibilis
4.1 Coexisting-choice-criteria model
The econometric evidence reviewed in Section 3 warrants a generalization of decision theory
to incorporate multiple coexisting choice criteria. An abstract formulation of such a theory
naturally draws upon the formal specification of econometric latent class models that capture
choice-criterion heterogeneity.(34,35)
Let C denote the set of coexisting choice criteria. The elements of this set are distinguished
by the integer-valued index c, where 1 ≤ c ≤ C := | C|.
We specialize the present formulation to the context of phishing-security modeling by pop-
ulating the set of choice criteria C with a view to capturing the essential features of human
beings in the security setting, as reviewed in Section 2. Email recipients are capable of rational
deliberation, but they are not overwhelmingly predisposed to it. They may instead form sub-
jective beliefs and valuations as captured by behavioral decision theory, but they also frequently
act in an intuitive or routinized fashion. Thus the empirical evidence reviewed in Section 2
suggests that human responses to phishing campaigns range across (at least) four identifiable
choice criteria, which we summarize in Table 1.16
Table 1: Email recipients’ coexisting choice criteria.
c=1 Normative deliberation: characterized by the internal-consistency axioms of complete-
ness, transitivity, independence of irrelevant alternatives (iia), continuity, Bayesian
updating, and time consistency (i.e. exponential discounting).
c=2 Behavioral: characterized by the weakening of iia, Bayesian updating, and time consis-
tency (i.e. to hyperbolic discounting), as per the behavioral decision making literature.
c=3 Impulsively click through: characterized by dominance of visceral emotions, which
suppress and displace deliberative reasoning; the remaining consistency axioms are
abandoned.
c=4 Routinely click straight through: characterized by routinization and automaticity;
again, the remaining consistency axioms are abandoned.
16Although the present formulation moves beyond the simplicity of a single-decision-criterion world view, each
criterion of Table 1 can be formalized by an existing theoretical framework. Normative deliberation is under-
pinned by the axiomatizations of e.g. von Neumann and Morgenstern, or Leonard Savage. Descriptively valid,
partly deliberative behavioral rationality is underpinned by axiomatizations of Cumulative Prospect Theory by
e.g. Wakker and Tversky.(36) The deliberative-rationality-displacing role of visceral emotions has been recognized
in the evolutionary study of behavior, represented in economics in particular by e.g. Robert H. Frank.(37) Au-
tomaticity, in which deliberative rationality is not so much bypassed as simply ‘not engaged’, has been given
theoretical underpinning in the psychology literature by Moors and De Houwer.(12) Imperfect and fallible recogni-
tion, categorization, and procedural responses have been widely documented,(38–42) for which general theoretical
underpinning may be obtained from e.g. Philippe Jehiel’s concept of analogy-based expectations equilibrium.(43)
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In general the choice-criterion selection probability will be conditional upon the decision
maker’s State of Mind, which in turn depends on an array of subject- and task-specific variables.
The net effect of all such variables determines an individual’s probability of adopting a given
choice criterion c at a given point in time, which we denote by pic
it
. Note that we necessarily
have 0 ≤ picit ≤ 1 and
∑
C
c=1 pi
c
it = 1 for all individuals i and time-points t.
Figure 1 illustrates a single agent’s stochastic State-of-Mind response to an arbitrary email.
This begins with the diamond-within-a-circle chance node, whereby the incoming email prob-
abilistically triggers one of the four State-of-Mind choice criteria. The fact that the ‘Routine’
(c=4) and ‘Impulsive’ (c=3) choice criteria override the possibility of sufficient deliberation to
result in a ‘quarantine’ choice with probability ρ = 1 is indicated by the absence of these respec-
tive edges. The email recipient’s incomplete information – over whether the email is benign or
malicious – is reflected in the broken-line information sets surrounding terminal-node payoffs.
Figure 1: An agent’s stochastic State-of-Mind response to an email.
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Note: Ex ante the agent is uncertain about an email’s true nature. The payoff at each terminal node is therefore either a
benefit due to correct classification (True Positive or True Negative), or a cost due to incorrect classification (FP or FN).
The email recipient is one of many agents who interact in a strategic phishing game. We
analyze an attacker’s optimal response to Figure 1 in Section 4.3, and we discuss the model’s
implications for organizational security policy in Section 4.4. Before doing so, we complete the
model by expanding the pic
it
expression for an agent i at time t. In general, pic
it
is operationalized
through a probability distribution that may be conditional upon: the characteristics of the
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decision maker Xit, the situational context Zit, and the attributes of the present choice task αt.
picit = pi
c
(
Xit, Zit,αt
)
, 0 ≤ picit ≤ 1,
C∑
c=1
picit = 1, (4.1a)
Xit = f
(
Γi, {Zi}<t , {α}<t , {Di}<t
)
. (4.1b)
The current characteristics Xit of agent i are jointly determined by their stable psychological
traits Γi, and by the history of: decision contexts {Zi}<t, decision-attributes {α}<t, and decision-
outcomes {Di}<t that constitutes their current set of experiences.
In order to develop a tractable expression for pic
it
we generalize the notion of match quality
introduced in the SDT literature(8) and we specialize the vectors appearing in (4.1a) to the
phishing-email application. For this application, the context Zit is that in which the agent
receives his emails. An agent whose context Zit and recent context history {Zi}<t leaves him
stressed, distracted, or hungry, will be less likely to respond deliberatively. The implications of
this observation for personal practice and organizational security policy are clear,17 and so we
suppress Zit hereafter to focus on the strategic interaction between attackers and recipients. For
simplicity we also suppress time subscripts hereafter to focus on the short-run implications of
the model.
Let us consider a phishing email with attributes α constructed within a finite attribute
space A = [0, 1]A. Each of the A components of email α captures the emphasis that it places
on each of A possible cues. The attacker chooses which cues to emphasize in order to influence
the recipient’s State of Mind. This determination of email ‘content’ is the attacker’s primary
decision variable.
The attacker is nevertheless constrained, in that increasing the emphasis placed on any one
cue necessarily diminishes the emphasis on the others. We model this constraint by requiring
||α|| ≤ 1.
The salient characteristics of the recipient are his idiosyncratic susceptibility to each type
of cue Si, and his baseline propensity χ
c
i
to apply each choice criterion c.18 Si is an C × A
dimensional matrix, each row of which sc
i
specifies the effectiveness of each possible cue type
17These are discussed further in Section 4.4,
18The baseline propensity to adopt a deliberative choice criterion χ1i is a stable trait
(44) that can be measured by
the cognitive Reflection Test of Frederick(42), or the Decision-Making Competence scale of Parker and Fischhoff(45).
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in invoking the choice criterion c. The agent’s characteristics Xi are therefore a matrix in
[0, 1]A×C × (R+)C , each row of which is a pair {sci , χ
c
i} that will determine the match quality
between the attacker’s choice of email cues α, and the susceptabilities of the receiving agent i.
We may now extend the approach of Kaivanto(8) by defining the choice-criterion-specific
match-quality function mc : [0, 1]A × [0, 1]A × R+ → R+, such that
mci(α) = m
c(α, sci , χ
c
i ) ∀ c ∈ C . (4.2)
For illustrative purposes, the simplest non-degenerate functional form for mc would be the
separable linear specification
mci(α) = χ
c
i + s
c
i · α , (4.3)
where · denotes the vector dot product.
Agent i’s choice-criterion-selection probabilies for a given email with cue bundle α may then
be defined in terms of the match-quality functions as follows:
pici (α) =
mci(α)∑
c∈Cm
c
i
(α)
∀ c ∈ C . (4.4)
4.2 Contrast with normatively rational deliberative special case
Under a normative decision-theoretic model of email-recipient decision making it is difficult to
explain the existence of phishing as an empirical phenomenon. Normatively rational decision
making is a special case of the coexisting-choice-criteria model in which pi1 = 1 and pi2 =
pi3 = pi4 = 0. If all email recipients were characterized by choice-criterion #1 alone, then the
success of an email phishing campaign would be determined entirely by factors largely outside
the attacker’s control: the benefit from correctly opening a non-malicious email (BTN), the
cost of erroneously quarantining non-malicious email (CFP), the cost of erroneously opening
a malicious email (CFN), and the benefit of correctly quarantining a malicious email (BTP).
Instead, variation in phishing campaigns’ success rate is driven by factors that do not directly
affect BTN, CFP, CFN and BTP.
(2,4,6,7)
It is straightforward to explain the existence of phishing and its empirical characteristics
under a coexisting-choice-criteria model of email-recipient behavior in which pi1 < 1 and
pi2, pi3, pi4 > 0. For instance choice-criterion #4 (routine, automaticity) is triggered by a phish-
12
ing email that masquerades as being part of the normal work flow by exploiting rich contextual
information about the employee, the organizational structure (e.g. boss’ and colleagues’ names,
responsibities, and working practices), and current organizational events and processes. Here
the email recipient simply does not engage in a deliberative process to evaluate whether the
email should be opened or not.
In contrast, phishing ploys designed to trigger choice criterion #3 (impulsively click through)
employ what Robert Cialdini calls the psychological principles of influence (see Section 2).(2,4–7)
Importantly, there is variation between individuals in their susceptibility to particular levers of
psychological influence.(7,46,47) For instance scarcity19 and authority20 have been found to be
more effective for young users, while reciprocation21 and liking/affinity22 have been found to be
more effective for older users.(7) These observations motivate the agent-specific subscript i in pic
i
and mci , and they are important in establishing the constrained-optimal APT attack pattern in
the following Subsection.
None of the aforementioned psychological levers would be effective if email users were solely
c≡1 normatively rational deliberators. Similarly, the well-documented effects of commitment,23
perceptual contrast,24 and social proof 25 (see(2,4,6,7)) are naturally explained by the existence
of coexisting choice criteria.
4.3 Stepping-stone penetration
Forensic investigations of APT attacks have found that the initial breach point is typically several
steps removed from the ultimate information-resource target(s). Deliberation-based models of
normatively rational decision making offer no particular insight into this empirical regularity. In
contrast, the coexisting-choice-criteria model encodes differentiation with which the stepping-
stone penetration pattern may be recovered as a constrained-optimal attack vector.
Let us consider an attacker who wishes to achieve a click-through from one of a minority
19e.g. Don’t miss out on this ‘once-in-a-lifetime opportunity!’
20e.g. law enforcement officers, tax officials
21the tendency to repay in kind even though there is no implicit obligation to do so
22the tendency to comply with requests made by people whom the user likes or with whom the user shares
common interests or common affiliations
23Also referred to as ‘consistency’. People feel obliged to behave in line with – consistently with – their previous
actions and commitments.
24Making an option seem attractive by framing it with respect to an option that is (contrived to be) noticeably
less attractive.
25People conform with majority social opinion, even when this manifestly contradicts immediate personal
perception, as in e.g. the Stanford Prison Experiment.
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subset of m target individuals within an organization consisting of n members. The target
individuals may be those who can authorize expenditure, or those with particular (e.g. database)
access rights. The attacker’s strategy at any given point in time consists of a choice of cue-bundle
αk, taken to solve the program
max
αk
m∑
i=1
C∑
c=1
pici (αk) · ρ
c
i · V − e(αk) s.t. ||αk|| ≤ 1 , (4.5)
where pici (αk) is the probability with which an individual will adopt choice criterion c given
the cues present in phishing email αk, where ρ
c is the probability of click-through given choice
criterion c, where V is the expected value of a successful attack, and where e(αk) is the cost of
the effort expended in the production and distribution of email αk. This formulation accords
with the near-zero marginal cost of including additional recipients to any existing email.(48,49)
The attacker may send one, or more, emails αk. Each email may be designed to induce
one particular State-of-Mind c, or could in principle adopt a mixed strategy. However, since
(by construction and by necessity)
∑
c∈C pi
c
i
= 1, any mixture of asymmetrically effective pure
strategies must be strictly less effective than at least one pure strategy. We therefore proceed by
characterizing the available pure strategies on the basis of the phishing literature,(2,4,6) before
eliminating strictly dominated strategies.
Table 2: Choice-criterion targeting characteristics.
Choice criterion Effort Click-through prob. Selection prob.a
c e
(
argmax
α
{pic}
)
ρc Prior Posterior
c=1: Deliberative low negligible high high
c=2: Behavioral low low med med
c=3: Impulsive low 1 low low
c=4: Routine high 1 low high
a i.e. max
α
{pic}
The quantities summarized in Table 2 determine the costs and expected benefits to the
attackers of targeting choice criterion c through their choice of α. There are two values of the
selection probability max
α
{pic} for each choice criterion c: the prior likelihood of invoking that
criterion, without insider information, and the posterior likelihood once access to such insider
information is obtained. Insider information does not affect the attackers’ ability to invoke choice
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criteria c ∈ {1, 2, 3}, but it does greatly aid the attacker’s ability to ‘spoof’ (i.e. simulate) a
routine email from a trusted colleague, and hence it substantially increases the posterior selection
probability for c = 4. The mechanism by which attackers may gain such insider information is
the successful phishing of a non-target member of the organization.
The most immediate implication of Equation (4.5) and Table 2 is that the Deliberative
strategy is strictly dominated by the Behavioral strategy, due to the negligible click-through
probability of the former. We next observe that the Behavioral strategy is, in turn, strictly
dominated by the Impulsive strategy whenever
ρ2 <
maxα{pi
3}
maxα{pi2}
, (4.6)
That is whenever the expected click-through probability under a Behavioral choice criterion is
less than the relative ease of invoking the Behavioral state compared to invoking the Impulsive
state. Table 2 suggests that this criterion is typically satisfied.
Next we consider the case of an attacker who has no insider information. In this case
it is trivial to see that an email which aims to invoke the Impulsive choice criterion strictly
dominates an email which aims to invoke the Routine choice criterion, due to the lower effort
cost of the former. The respective probabilities of successfully gaining a click-through from a
target individual are then:
Prob.
(
non-target
clickthrough
)
= 1−(1−max
α
{pi3})n−m > 1−(1−max
α
{pi3})m = Prob.
(
target
clickthrough
)
which demonstrates that there is a greater likelihood of the attacker gaining a click-through
from a non-target individual than from a target individual in any attack without insider in-
formation. Note that this conclusion would be further strengthened if we were to assume that
target individuals were less susceptible to phishing attacks than the average individual.
The attackers’ first attempt therefore has three possible outcomes: (i) they may have suc-
cessfully achieved their objective, (ii) they may have gained insider information by achieving a
non-target click-through, or (iii) they may have achieved nothing. In the first case the attackers
move on to acquire and exfiltrate the information. In the third case the situation is unchanged,
and so the phishing campaign is continued with further broadcast of phishing email(s) contain-
ing (possibly modified) Impulsive cues. But in the second case insider information is obtained,
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whereby the posterior click-through likelihoods of Table 2 become operative. In this case, it is
evident from Table 2 that an email which aims to invoke the Routine choice criterion is likely
to dominate an email which aims to invoke the Impulsive criterion, specifically whenever
e
(
argmax
α
{pi4}
)
e
(
argmax
α
{pi3}
) < maxα{pi
4}
maxα{pi3}
. (4.7)
Thus the attacker’s optimal approach is likely to lead to a ‘stepping-stone’ attack, wherein a
non-target individual is first compromised by invoking an impulsive choice criterion, so that a
target individual can then be compromised by using insider information to invoke a Routine
choice criterion. Sufficient conditions for this to be the most likely outcome are those of Table
2 and inequalities (4.6) and (4.7).
4.4 Implications for Organizational Security Policy
The model we present has important implications for organizational security policy. Let us first
consider the cultural and procedural aspects of organizational security, before turning to specific
implications for email security training and evaluation.
In Section 4.1 we noted the potential importance of the situational context Zit in which an
email is received. For example, it is well-known that an individual who is under intense time-
pressure is less likely, if not not simply unable, to engage in deliberative decision making.(50–52)
The present model makes plain the security-vulnerability dangers of highly routinized email-
processing practices, even if these would otherwise be efficient. Relatedly, it is vital that or-
ganizational culture supports the precautionary verification of suspicious messages, since any
criticism of such verification practices is likely to increase the risk of behavioral click-throughs
in future. These observations suggest that Information Security Officers should actively engage
with wider aspects of organizational culture and practices.
The model also yields specific procedural implications for email security training. It is clear
that the direct effect of a training course in which participants consciously classify emails as either
genuine or malicious would be to reduce ρ1 (see Figure 1), however for most individuals ρ1 is
already relatively low (see Table 2): given that an individual implements a deliberative choice
criterion they are relatively unlikely to fall prey to a phishing attack. Section 4.3 demonstrated
that a strategic attacker would instead seek to exploit the much greater vulnerabilities of ρ3 and
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ρ4, and so training that focuses on reducing ρ1 is likely to have limited effectiveness.
The challenge for Information Security Officers is that the vulnerabilities ρ3 and ρ4 are
essentially fixed at 1.26 Once an Impulsive or Routine State of Mind takes over, click-through is
a foregone conclusion. Training should therefore focus on reducing individuals’ criterion-selection
probabilities pi3 and pi4. There is evidence that an individual’s propensity to act deliberatively
can be raised through external interventions,(42) and the coexisting-choice-criteria framework
suggests that this could best be achieved by helping employees to understand: (i) their inherent
vulnerability to phishing when making choices either Routinely or Impulsively, and (ii) the
psychological ploys by which attackers may induce Impulsive or Routine States of Mind.
Analogous implications exist for procedures which aim to test organizational security by
means of simulated phishing emails. Where such a test is appended to a training module, it
tests (at best) some combination of ρ1 and ρ2, because trainees will be aware that they are
attempting to identify phishing emails. Furthermore, the literature on incentives suggests that
where such a test is incentivized with some required pass-rate, it is likely to be less informative
as to the true vulnerability level because it is more likely to generate a pure measure of ρ1. Tests
of security should therefore be blinded, for example by an unannounced simulation of an email
attack. Moreover, such tests should be varied and repeated, since any single email α can only
contain one specific cue bundle, and so can only test an individual’s susceptibility pic(α) to that
particular cue bundle.
5 CONCLUSION
As the basis for understanding and modeling the behavior of phishing targets, normative delib-
erative rationality proves wholly inadequate. This paper introduces a coexisting-choice-criteria
model of decision making that generalizes both normative and ‘dual process’ theories of decision
making. We show that this model offers a tractable working framework within which to develop
an understanding of phishing-email response behavior. This offers an improvement over existing
SDT-based models of phishing-response behavior,(8,9) insofar as it avoids the commingling of
peripheral-route-persuasion pathways.
We also show that the framework may be usefully deployed in modeling the choices and
26In principle an organization could substantially reduce ρ4 by implementing organization-wide 2-stage security
procedures before any email link or attachment is opened, however such measures have not been widely adopted
due to their efficiency cost (as discussed in Sections 1 and 2).
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tradeoffs confronted by APT attackers, who must make decisions about the nature, composition,
and roll-out of phishing campaigns. We illustrate this by tackling a problem that has confounded
conventional normative-rationality-based modeling approaches: Why do so many APT attacks
follow a ‘stepping-stone’ penetration pattern? Under the coexisting-choice-criteria model, the
attacker faces a tradeoff between (i) designing an email that is highly targeted, invokes the
‘Routine’ choice criterion, but requires detailed inside information, and (ii) designing an email
that cannot be targeted as effectively, invokes the ‘Impulsive’ choice criterion, and requires only
public information. However, success with (ii) provides the attacker with access to the inside
information with which to implement (i). Thus the stepping-stone attack vector arises out of
the attacker’s tradeoffs precisely when confronting email users whose behavior is captured by
the coexisting-choice-criteria model.
We further demonstrate that the model provides new insights with practical relevance for
Information Security Officers. We derive specific recommendations for information training
and testing as well as for organizational procedures, practices, and policies. In particular, the
model highlights the importance of considering the composite between the probability of being
induced into State of Mind c and the probability of then clicking through given this State of
Mind. Hence training must address the different State-of-Mind selection probabilities pic as
well as the associated conditional click-through probabilities ρc. Similarly, training-effectiveness
testing – assurance of learning, in effect – must also cover the range of different State-of-Mind
choice criteria. In light of the coexisting-choice-criteria model, the single-test-email approach
should be deprecated.
Finally, the coexisting-choice-criteria model highlights organizations’ vulnerability to spear-
phishing attacks that invoke automatic email processing routines. Working practices in most
commercial, voluntary, and public-sector organizations presume that links and email attach-
ments are benign when sent from within the organization or by customers, suppliers, or partner
organizations. This is a major vulnerability that is as much a reflection of organizational cul-
ture as it is a reflection of explicit security protocols (or absence thereof). This suggests that
Information Security Officers could – and perhaps should – be afforded a broader role in shaping
organizational culture.
18
References
1. Petty RE, Cacioppo JT. Communication and Persuasion: Central and Peripheral Routes to
Attitude Change. New York, NY: Springer-Verlag, 1986.
2. Rusch JJ. The “social engineering” of internet fraud. Proceedings of the In-
ternet Society Global Summit (INET’99), 1999, June 22–25, San Jose, CA.
http://www.isoc.org/inet99/proceedings/3g/3g_2.htm
3. Langenderfer J, Shimp TA. Consumer vulnerability to scams, swindles, and fraud: A new
theory of visceral influences on persuasion. Psychology and Marketing, 2001; 18:763–783.
4. Mitnick KD, Simon WL. The Art of Deception: Controlling the Human Element of Security.
Indianapolis, IN: Wiley, 2002.
5. Cialdini RB. Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion. New York, NY: Collins, 2007.
6. Hadnagy C. Social Engineering: The Art of Human Hacking. Indianapolis, IN: Wiley, 2011.
7. Oliveira D, Rocha H, Yang H, Ellis D, Dommaraju S, Muradoglu M, Weir D, Soliman
A, Lin T, Ebner N. Dissecting spear phishing emails for older vs young adults: On the
interplay of weapons of influence and life domains in predicting susceptibility to phishing.
Proceedings of the 2017 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, 6412–
6424. http://chi2017.ac.org/proceedings.html
8. Kaivanto K. The effect of decentralized behavioral decision making on system-level risk.
Risk Analysis, 2014; 34:2121–2142.
9. Canfield CI, Fischhoff B. Setting priorities for behavioral interventions: An application to
reducing phishing risk. Risk Analysis, in press. doi: 10.1111/risa.12917.
10. Embrey I. States of nature and states of mind: A generalised theory of decision-
making, evaluated by application to human capital development. Working Paper, Lan-
caster University Management School, Economics Working Paper Series, 2017; 2017/032.
http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/89106/1/LancasterWP2017_032.pdf
11. Tversky A, Kahneman D. Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of un-
certainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1992; 5:297–323.
19
12. Moors A, DeHouwer J. Automaticity: A theoretical and conceptual analysis. Psychological
Bulletin, 2006, 132:297–326.
13. Laibson D. A cue-theory of consumption. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2001; 116:81–
119.
14. Bernheim D, Rangel A. Addiction and cue-triggered decision processes. The American Eco-
nomic Review, 2004; 94:1558–1590.
15. Anderson R, Moore T. Information security: Where computer science, economics and psy-
chology meet. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A, 2009; 367;2717–2727.
16. US Office of Management and Budget. Fiscal Year 2011 Report to Congress on the Imple-
mentation of The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002. March 7, 2012.
17. Johnson NB. Feds’ chief cyberthreat: ‘Spear phishing’ attacks. Federal Times, Feb 20, 2013.
18. Perlroth N. Hackers are targeting nuclear facilities, Homeland Security Dept. and F.B.I. say.
New York Times, July 6, 2017.
19. FBI and DHS. Advanced Persistent Threat Activity Targeting Energy and
Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. ‘Amber’ Alert (TA17-293A), Oct 20, 2017.
https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-293A
20. Elgin B, Lawrence D, Riley M. Coke gets hacked
and doesn’t tell anyone. Bloomberg, Nov 4, 2012.
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-04/coke-hacked-and-doesn-t-tell.html
21. Loewenstein G. Out of control: Visceral influences on economic behavior. Organizational
Behavior and Human Performance, 1996; 65:272–292.
22. Loewenstein G. Emotions in economic theory and economic behavior. American Economic
Review, 2000; 90:426–432.
23. Easley B. Biz-Op: How to Get Rich with “Business Opportunity” Frauds and Scams. Port
Townsend, WA: Loompanics Unlimited, 1994.
24. Hong J. The state of phishing attacks. Communications of the ACM, 2012; 55:74–81.
25. Kahneman D. Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York, NY: Penguin, 2012.
20
26. Harrison GW, Rutstro¨m EE. Expected utility theory and prospect theory: One wedding
and a decent funeral. Experimental Economics, 2009; 12:133–158.
27. Coller M, Harrison GW, Rutstro¨m EE. Latent process heterogeneity in discounting behavior.
Oxford Economic Papers, 2011; 64:375–391.
28. Houser D, Keane M, McCabe K. Behavior in a dynamic decision problem: An analysis of
experimental evidence using a Bayesian type classification algorithm. Econometrica, 2004;
72:781–822.
29. Stahl DO, Wilson PW. On players’ models of other players: Theory and experimental
evidence. Games and Economic Behavior, 1995; 10:218–254.
30. Nagel R. Unraveling guessing games: An experimental study. American Economic Review,
1995; 85:1313–1326.
31. Stahl DO. Boundedly rational rule learning in a guessing game. Games and Economic Be-
havior, 1995; 16:303–313.
32. Bosch-Dome`nech A, Montalvo JG, Nagel R, Satorra A. A finite mixture analysis of beauty-
contest data using generalized beta distributions. Experimental Economics, 2010; 13:461–
475.
33. Rothschild C, McLay L, Guikema S. Adversarial risk analysis with incomplete information:
A level-k approach. Risk Analysis, 2012; 32:1219–1231.
34. Hess S, Stathopoulos A, Daly A. Allowing for heterogeneous decision rules in discrete choice
models: An approach and four case studies. Transportation, 2012; 39:565–591.
35. Swait J, Adamowicz W. The influence of task complexity on consumer choice: A latent class
model of decision strategy switching. Journal of Consumer Research, 2001; 28:135–148.
36. Wakker P, Tversky A. An axiomatization of cumulative prospect theory. Journal of Risk
and Uncertainty, 1993; 7:147–175.
37. Frank, RH. Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions. New York, NY:
Norton, 1988.
21
38. Chou E, McConnell M, Nagel R, Plott CR. The control of game form recognition in ex-
periments: Understanding dominant strategy failures in a simple twoperson guessing game.
Experimental Economics, 2009; 12:159–179.
39. Kaivanto K, Kroll EB, Zabinski M. Bias-trigger manipulation and task-form understanding
in Monty Hall. Economics Bulletin, 2014; 34:89–98.
40. Goldstein DG, Taleb NN. We don’t quite know what we are talking about when we talk
about volatility. Journal of Portfolio Management, 2007; 22:84–86.
41. VanLehn K. Mind bugs: The Origins of Procedural Misconceptions. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1990.
42. Frederick S. Cognitive reflection and decision making. Journal of Economic Perspectives,
2005; 19:25–42.
43. Jehiel P. Analogy-based expectation equilibrium. Journal of Economic Theory, 2005; 123:81–
104.
44. Parker AM, De Bruin WB, Fischhoff B, Weller J. Robustness of decision-making compe-
tence: Evidence from two measures and an 11-year longitudinal study. Journal of Behavioral
Decision Making, in press. doi:10.1002/bdm.2059
45. Parker AM, Fischhoff B. Decision-making competence: External validation through an
individual-differences approach. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 2005; 18;1–27.
46. Vishwanath A, Herath T, Chen R, Want J, Rao HR. Why do people get phished? Testing
indiviual differences in phishing vulnerability within an integrated, information processing
model. Decision Support Systems, 2011; 51:576–586.
47. Williams EJ, Beardmore A, Joinson AJ. Individual differences in susceptibility to online
influence: A theoretical review., Computers in Human Behavior, 2017; 72:412–421.
48. Shapiro C, Varian HR. Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy.
Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1998.
49. Anderson RJ. Security Engineering: A Guide to Dependable Distributed Systems. Indi-
anapolis, IN: John Wiley, 2008.
22
50. Hwang MI. Decision making under time pressure: A model for information systems research.
Information & Management, 1994; 27:197–203.
51. Maule AJ, Edland AC. The effects of time-pressure on judgment and decision making.
In: Ranyard R, Crozier W, Svenson O (eds). Decision Making: Cognitive Models and
Explanation. London: Routledg, 1997:189–204.
52. Steigenberger N, Lu¨bcke T, Fiala H, Riebschla¨ger. Decision Modes in Complex Environ-
ments. London: CRC Press (Taylor & Francis), 2017.
23
